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Abstract. Nineteen Prescott Fire Department, Granite Mountain Hot Shot
(GMHS) wildland ﬁreﬁghters (WF) perished in Arizona in June 2013 Yarnell Hill
Fire, an inexplicable wildland ﬁre disaster. In complex wildland ﬁres, sudden,
dynamic changes in human factors andﬁre conditions can occur, thusmistakes can
be unfortunately fatal. Individual and organizational faults regarding the pre-
dictable, puzzling, human failures that will result in future WF deaths are
addressed. The GMHS were individually, then collectively ﬁxated with aban-
doning their Safety Zone to reengage, committing themselves at the worst possible
time, to relocate to another Safety Zone - a form of collective tunnel vision. Our
goal is to provoke meaningful discussion toward improved wildland ﬁreﬁghter
safety with practical solutions derived from a long-established wildland ﬁre-
ﬁghter expertise/performance in a fatality-prone profession. Wildﬁre fatalities are
unavoidable, hence these proposals, applied to ongoing training, can signiﬁcantly
contribute to other well-thought-out and validated measures to reduce them.
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1 Introduction
Due to the continuing need for research on the Yarnell Hill (YH) Fire fatalities as well
as this paper’s focus on the Human Factors and Human Errors, some sections of the
current paper may reiterate important inclusions from the authors’ previous paper.
Additional information and analyses in sufﬁcient detail will be included [1].
The title derives from Human Factors researcher Charles Perrow referring to “data on
low-consequence events”, showing that organizations may have risk under control, and
therefore harbor a perceived “great safety culture”, because they have the data to prove it
[2]. He says this, “… can encourage a collective sense of invulnerability”, underscoring
Janis’s seminal work on Groupthink, where a “…warning of an incomprehensible and
unimaginable event cannot be seen, because it cannot be believed” [2, 3].
Many of us continue to struggle with convincingly making sense of the June 30,
2013 YH Fire. The “how and why” of 19 of the 20 Granite Mountain Hot Shot
(GMHS) fatalities was, is, and always will be, on an unfathomable scale a nagging
enigma. Many wildland ﬁreﬁghters (WF) and supervisors saw the GMHS operations as
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exceedingly unsafe. However, most in the wildland ﬁreﬁghting realm never saw this
coming, because in the end, no one would have believed it possible that so many men
could have died on a wildland ﬁre in one deadly fell swoop.
1.1 Background
Wildland ﬁreﬁghting is recognized as “inherently dangerous” [4]. Countless ﬁreline
distractions limit discerning conflicting organizational and systems goals, hence
avoiding gradual drifts into failure, which stupeﬁes WFs at times. Nineteen GMHS
WF, sponsored by the Prescott Fire Department (PFD), perished together on the June
30, 2013 YH Fire in Arizona. This infamous tragedy is accepted by most WFs as the
most contentious, heart-rending, inexplicable, and vexing wildland ﬁre disaster.
Wildland ﬁre fatalities are inevitabilities based on the interactions of complex envi-
ronmental, social, cultural, and individual behaviors. Several of the GMHS decisions
were critically flawed because of these complexities and their own limitations. Their
resolve to vacate their Safety Zone (SZ) was one element in a long chain of bad
decisions that led them well beyond safe and tenable boundaries into a fatal ﬁre
entrapment [1]. Many career WFs deemed the circumstances of this event as pre-
dictable and reasoned, had the GMHS heeded their prescient WF instincts this disaster
could have been prevented or at least lessened. However, others who disagree might
consider this hindsight bias.
Both individual and organizational faults are considered to better distinguish the
predictable, yet puzzling, human failures that will result in future tragic wildland ﬁre
deaths [5]. The collective wisdom holds that to lessen such tragedies, sage counsel from
numerous authors, researchers, and practitioners, primarily comprised of experienced
warriors from the aviation, military, and general ﬁreﬁghting disciplines, must be fol-
lowed. Their critical and combined guidance underscores the following:
• the signiﬁcance of continued and repetitive realistic training;
• avoiding feckless safety exhortations, (e.g., “Safety First,” and “Stay Safe”);
• vigilant assessments by accurate and timely interpretations of warning signs;
• ample and thoughtful mitigation including debating “what ifs”;
• refraining from high-risk and little-to no-gain engagements; and
• cautious discernment and professional implementation.
Regarding the YH Fire, the GMHS were ﬁrst individually and then collectively
ﬁxated with abandoning their adequate SZ to unwillingly reengage and commit
themselves at the worst possible time. This was allegedly to relocate to the Boulder
Springs Ranch (BSR), another SZ [1]. Besides a gap in critical intelligence, this
impulsive action likely occurred to alleviate their misperceived notions of
non-productivity, evidenced in their text messages. This may have swayed the GMHS
leaders’ Crew reengagement order to them to assist in the Yarnell evacuations after
they had earlier turned down the request [1]. The listed factors below may well have
added to faulty decisions:
• cultural influences of municipal ﬁre departments with collateral wildland ﬁre
responsibilities to save structures - a form of collective tunnel vision;
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• contentious GMHS leadership and absence of sound leadership;
• weak Crew cohesion using consensus-seeking (“absence of leadership”); and
• marginal to nonexistent situational awareness of changing conditions.
Two examples of GMHS outliers support the authors’ above inferences. First, one
GMHS, a former Payson Hot Shot (HS), was a quasi-expert regarding wildﬁre fatality
case studies per his former supervisor. Both his girlfriend and his sister were incred-
ulous that this GMHS failed to speak up when the Crew decided to leave “the black”.
“He knew better,” they said [6]. Second, a Rookie GMHS Marine Scout sniper had
received intense leadership training in the art of war [7]. His widow believed he would
only have left a safe ridge and hiked into danger if directed to do so; he was “… a
Marine … used to following orders” [1, 26]. The authors contend both men likely
recognized the hazardous, impulsive attitudes and “broken conversations” [8] that led
to the toxic Groupthink that infected their Crew. Despite these outliers’ attempts at
dissuasion, the GMHS incredibly left their SZ instead of having cogent group dis-
cussions, which may have prevented or lessened the deaths. Section 4.2 covers
Groupthink more.
1.2 Motivation and Goals
We are told to “prove all things” [9]. The authors assert that the YH Fire Serious
Accident Investigation Report (SAIR) was disingenuously labeled as “Factual” by the
Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT-SAIR) [10]. One notable Human Factors
expert, Dr. Ted Putnam, argues that relying on debatable “factual” investigation reports
is questionable [11]. This paper’s authors strongly contest several of the SAIR
assessments of “factual”. Inspired to ﬁnd more hidden truths, the authors critically
analyze the dubious SAIT ﬁndings and long-established pattern of determining “con-
clusions” ﬁrst and then ﬁnding “facts” to support them (e.g., the Human Factors
Specialist using an idealized image instead a real photo to depict critical ﬁre behavior
Fig. 1).
Wildﬁre fatalities are regrettably unavoidable. “Wildland ﬁreﬁghting is a high-risk
occupation, evidenced each year by deaths or injuries in the line of duty;” and we
should “… identify factors responsible for past fatalities, [to] mitigate those factors in
future ﬁre seasons” [12]. The present authors intend to provoke meaningful discussion
among all WFs toward improved Wildland Fireﬁghting safety. Mistakes often occur
through the faulty actions of many people; it is mostly the accumulation of many
smaller lapses and mistakes that ﬁnally result in the bigger error(s) [13]. To meet this
goal, this paper:
• identiﬁes WF decision errors speciﬁc to the YH Fire;
• applies understanding for training, procedural, and/or systemic changes; and
• analyzes the SAIT-SAIR and further evidence that contest the SAIT ﬁndings.
Emphases are placed on the following critical areas:
• Wildland Fireﬁghting Rules
• Environmental Influences
• Human Factors and Human Failure
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• Organizational Cultures and Influences
• Conclusion with Recommendations
Note: The paper’s content reflects the views of the authors, both retired HS Crew
Superintendents, responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented
herein. Some content may contain subject matter judged by some to be disturbing.
2 Wildland Fireﬁghting Rules
2.1 General Overview
All WFs are trained with speciﬁc rules, crucial to follow to ensure good direction,
leadership, safety, and vigilance. The Standard Fireﬁghting Orders, organized delib-
erately and sequentially, are to be carried out analytically in all ﬁre situations [14]. The
18 Watch Out Situations, (i.e., guidelines, are faced on all ﬁres, more to warn of
impending dangers). The authors and experienced WFs contend knowing and abiding
by the wildland ﬁreﬁghting rules works and promotes good, safe decisions and out-
comes [1, 13, 15, 16]. The authors are ﬁrm: there is no known wildﬁre fatality when all
the Standard Fireﬁghting Orders are followed, and the 18 Watch Outs mitigated
(10 & 18).
The most critical of the established Wildland Fireﬁghting Rules are listed in the
Incident Response Pocket Guide (NWCG) [17]; 1. Standard Fireﬁghting Orders; 2.
Eighteen Watch Out Situations; 3. Downhill Checklist; Lookouts - Communications -
Escape Routes – Safety Zones (LCES); 5. Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on
Tragedy/Near-Miss Fires; and 6. Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Watch Outs. “If
ﬁreﬁghters follow the Standard Fireﬁghting Orders and are alerted to the 18 Watch Out
Situations, much of the risk of ﬁreﬁghting can be reduced” [14]. Jointly they are
responsible for saving tens of thousands of wildland ﬁreﬁghter lives each-and-every ﬁre
season [1]. It is common knowledge and practice in the WF community that these rules
work. All ﬁreﬁghters must know, understand, and apply them on every ﬁre, every time
despite complaints by some to the contrary [1, 15, 16]. On most wildﬁre fatalities,
questionable actions were initiated, in conflict with several established ﬁreﬁghting
decision rules. “Downhill ﬁreline construction is hazardous in steep terrain, fast-burning
fuels, or rapidly changing weather” according to human factors researchers [18].
Australian WF created a novel method to address Watch Out #11 - Unburned fuel
between you and the ﬁre [17]. They note: “ﬁreﬁghters engaged in parallel or indirect
attack are working in a dead man zone if they do not appreciate the time and space
required to ﬁnd safe refuge.” The GMHS were in a ‘dead man zone’ once they left their
refuge [19] and perilously continued downhill in a drainage (chute/chimney) and ﬁnally
into a deadly box canyon or bowl, all proven potentially deadly, in unburned fuel.
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2.2 Consequences of Inattention - Fatality Fires and ‘Lunch Spot’ Nexus
Theory
Additionally, the multi-fatality South Canyon (1994), 30-Mile (2001), and YH (2013)
Fires shared a common element when the WFs disengaged to a designated Lunch Spot.
In this setting, due to numerous physiological and psychological circumstances, (e.g.,
fatigue, stress, dehydration, alcohol-related impairment (hangovers), distractions,
interruptions, etc.) - time essentially stood still. In each of these above noted tragic
wildﬁres, when the WFs reengaged, they were evidently unmindful of basic wildland
ﬁreﬁghting training and ﬁre behavior markers which favored staying put. They were so
engrossed with “discussing their options” of staying put or reengaging, they ceased
observing more pressing tasks, like the rapidly changing weather. They let go of
strategic management for less serious, less vital events, known as strategic omission
[20].
Credible research on attention found when someone is otherwise engaged, at times
they fail to “see” otherwise noticeable, fully visible, - yet unexpected objects or events,
(i.e. ‘inattentional blindness’ [IB]). A likely severe result is that it can sometimes lead
one to miss items that one wanted or, more importantly, needed to experience [21, 22].
If one’s attention is set for a certain number of primary-task items and the offered items
meet their expectation, the individual may be more likely to exhibit IB for an
unforeseen and yet likely critical visual event [21, 22]. IB was driven more by situa-
tional and task factors, … than by individual-differences variables [21]. This may help
explain some of why the GMHS and others faced and then reacted to this obscure
perilous occurrence.
3 Environmental Influences
3.1 Fuels, Weather, Topography, and Fire Behavior
Fireﬁghters discuss wildland ﬁres in terms of fuels and what is burning: Fuel type, fuel
loading, fuel availability, live and/or dead material including structures. Weather is the
most variable, with daytime and the most critical, nighttime temperatures, relative
humidity, and winds. Topography is the shape of the earth’s surface including its relief
and its natural and man-made features, such as steep slopes with drainages, known as
chimneys and chutes, slope aspect, and altitude. The last environmental influence, ﬁre
behavior, relates to how the ﬁre is currently burning and expected to burn (e.g.,
smoldering, running, etc.). WFs know the ﬁre always signals its intentions. Brieﬁngs
and debrieﬁngs should always include these topics. The terms are noted and further
clariﬁed in the overall Wildland Fireﬁghting Rules in the IRPG [17] and elsewhere
[23].
3.2 Yarnell Hill Fire
The YH Fire occurred in west-central Arizona west of the town of Yarnell along a
north-south mountainous ridge with elevations ranging from 4,500 to 6,000 feet.
Within the ﬁre area, the terrain varies from steep ridges to nearly flat valley bottoms
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with numerous rock outcroppings and boulder piles [10]. The terrain was covered with
by a dense, volatile grass crop due to prior years’ heavy rains with nearly impenetrable,
decadent chaparral one to ten feet in height, unburned since 1966, creating an explosive
fuel bed with extremely high rates of spread and extreme resistance to control. Arizona
had experienced a severe drought for several years and was critically hot and dry in the
prior weeks. On other fatal and near-fatal Southwestern ﬁres and prescribed burns, the
strongest and most variable winds occur during thunderstorms, and generate extreme
downdrafts, micro-bursts, outflows, and gust fronts, that adversely affect ﬁre behavior,
thus exacerbating and complicating WF choices, priorities, and safety [1, 10, 24].
The ﬁre began small in difﬁcult terrain in desiccated heavy chaparral fuel and grew
exponentially (i.e., when the value of a quantity at any time is its previous value
multiplied by a certain number, the same number each time) as the intense outflow
downdraft winds increased in both size and complexity, overwhelming the initial and
extended attack WFs and the incoming Incident Management Teams (IMT) [5, 24].
Curiously, per the SAIR, “As complexity dramatically increased starting Saturday
evening, ﬁre management went through multiple transitions from a Type 4 through a
Type 1 incident in fewer than 20 h” [10]. In Sect. 5, the authors stress that the SAIT
failed to go further in their investigation and discuss the adverse effects this (mis)-
management and (in)actions of the entire ﬁre had on the individual and overall WFs’
decisions to safely and effectively ﬁght the YH Fire [11]. They may well have
examined these indispensable revelatory details, but never published them, which
might suggest misfeasance.
4 Human Factors and Human Failure
Human factors can be deduced as the cause signiﬁcant consequences on wildland ﬁres
even when only ﬁre behavior evidence is presented [16, 25]. Following the rigid
Standard Fireﬁghting Orders, created in the 1950s, and adhering to the cautionary 18
Watch Out Situations, WFs gain proactive measures to reduce severe outcomes [17].
Annually, WFs validate the wildland ﬁreﬁghting rules during required ﬁre refreshers
and trainings. It is widely accepted in the wildland ﬁreﬁghting realm that all 19 GMHS
could have survived in the YH Fire had they held to these tried-and-true rules [1, 15,
16, 26]. Challenging the SAIT-SAIR, the present authors contend that the SAIT
omitted seriously addressing Human Failure, speciﬁcally how, why, and when the
GMHS considered their risky actions which had been acceptable for years, thus
allowing them to unwisely drift into failure [11, 26]. Dr. Putnam and others argue that a
lack of honest examination of the Human Factors influencing wildﬁre fatalities is
endemic to all SAITs and Reviews dating back to the 1949 Mann Gulch Fire in
Montana [1, 11].
4.1 Individual Blame and Organizational Factors
Catino (2008) established two distinct tactics for explaining incident origins and
dynamics: Individual Blame Logic (IBL) and Organizational Function Logic (OFL).
IBL suits societal calls to identify accident cause(s) and transgressor(s) while OFL is an
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organizational and functional tactic, aimed at ﬁnding the factors within the system
behind event occurrence [5]. In the OFL method, expectations are that similar events
will not recur or will infrequently occur once these influences are removed [5].
Both IBL and OFL breaches were present regarding the GMHS, based on a history of
bad decisions with good outcomes from 2009 to 2013 [1, 16, 26]. This applies to all
other fatal wildﬁres. Regarding the YH Fire, the authors assert that upper-level GMHS
supervisors were liable for their WFs’ deaths. Many others in the broader
municipal/wildland ﬁre culture may also have indirectly contributed to the GMHS
outcomes.
While moving vehicles, the GMHS lookout overheard radio trafﬁc between the
Division Supervisor (DIVS-A) and the acting GMHS supervisor, with 17 Crew
members, safely atop a ridge. In the radio call, DIVS-A told the GMHS to leave “the
[safe] black,” and join him at the BSR. The acting GMHS Supt. objected saying such a
move would be perilous. This turned into a dispute due to “ambiguity of authority”
[18]. The Acting GMHS Supt. told DIVS-A either, “we can’t make it” or “we’re not
going to make it” contrary to the SAIT assertion of a 30-min communication gap [1,
10, 26, 27].
4.2 Groupthink
Groupthink symptoms are: (a) illusion of invulnerability, (b) illusion of morality,
(c) rationalization, (d) stereotyping, (e) self-censorship, (f) illusion of unanimity,
(g) contrarian condemnation, and (h) reliance on cognitive gatekeepers to maintain the
status quo [3]. Groups affected by Groupthink often ignore safer alternatives. One of
the more famous examples of Groupthink was during the 1996 Mt. Everest Disaster in
which six climbers perished [28]. A similar incident was when 2012 Stevens Pass
Washington avalanche survivor Michelson noted how difﬁcult it was to break away
from the group [8]. On the YH Fire, Groupthink clearly prompted the fatal outcome
when the GMHS hiked downhill into a deadly bowl at the worst possible time. During
a news conference, the PFD Wildland Battalion Chief (WBC) said he would have
followed them blindfolded, that they, “… stuck together” and “… saw and felt the same
way”, protecting their integrity and their decisions to justify their faulty actions [17,
26]. Similarly, the GMHS Assistant Supt.’s PFD self-evaluation stated: “I think as
leaders we need to support each other and back up each other’s decisions and actions”
[29]. This is true if and only if they are safe, realistic, and achievable, or else they
should be discounted and rejected.
4.3 Willingness to Properly Refuse Risk and Turn Down Protocol
In the quasi-military wildland ﬁre realm, one is to obey orders with exceptions [1, 26].
Per the IRPG, a WF is obligated to identify alternative(s) to unsafe assignment(s) and
refuse them if needed, a supervisor must tell the WFs that others have refused it.
Ideally, this protocol, properly implemented, is vital to effective risk management as it
provides timely hazard identiﬁcation to the chain of command, raises risk awareness for
leaders and subordinates, and promotes responsibility [17]. Most times, however, WFs
are not told others refused the assignment. Even worse, the WFs that have refused are
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usually transferred to another Division doing irrelevant work, referred to as “Division
Siberia”, a sector of the ﬁre already extinguished. Most times, those WFs are ﬁnally
sent back to their home unit with poor evaluations. Most WFs fear utilizing this known
essential protocol and would instead likely follow those orders against their better
judgement. The Acting GMHS Supt. weakly tried this protocol, however, neither he
nor the Crew persuasively employed this option to counter DIVS-A’s order to leave
their SZ [27].
4.4 Differences in Leadership Traits - Risk Averse vs. Risk Taking
Collins and Hansen claim, “In an uncertain and unforgiving environment following the
madness of crowds is a good way to get killed” [30]. Accordingly, the GMHS, a large,
conﬁdent group with a herd mentality, taking unnecessary risks, exempliﬁed this
concept. Interestingly, research and empirical data indicate gender plays a role in risk
taking. One study regarding computerized wargames, aggression, testosterone, and
overconﬁdence indicates most females were risk averse, compared to their more
risk-prone male counterparts [31]. A realistic example was when avalanche survivor
Michelson felt she could have convinced the other skiers to discontinue if only she had
stayed with them [8]. Another empirical example is of a female supervisor who, on the
1994 South Canyon Fire, refused an eventual deadly downhill ﬁreline assignment [18].
Researchers purport males are mostly identiﬁed as “serial” thinkers, who construct
tiered plans of action and process data one step at a time - aspects of catalogued
thought. Conversely, females, identiﬁed as “parallel” thinkers, can achieve many
similar simple tasks at once, therefore recognized as more capable of dealing with
complex issues. Thus, possibly intervening in option discussions, hence able to avert
similar disasters [22, 31].
4.5 Plan Continuation and Conﬁrmation Biases
Plan continuation bias is the notion of pressing on when things were beginning to go
bad very near one’s destination. This may impede a crew’s ability to recognize they
need to change their course of action, a very powerful, unconscious cognitive prefer-
ence. This bias may be especially strong during a transition phase and might influence a
WF’s ability to notice subtle cues indicating that the original conditions have changed
[32]. WFs are very mission oriented. However, as stress increases, particularly during
deteriorating weather and increasing ﬁre behavior, the ability to dispassionately eval-
uate the situation, accept the reality that conditions are unfavorable and decide to abort
the mission drops off sharply the closer one is to their destination. The closer one is to
this end-point, the more one reveals one’s tenacious resolve to proceed.
4.6 Decision-Making Under Stress
Under intense pressures and stress, one falls back on familiar habits. Following are
three examples. On the 1994 South Canyon Fire, the Incident Commander
(IC) sharpened his chainsaw rather than managing his resources in critical conditions.
On the 2011 30-Mile Fire, the Crew Boss/IC, during increased ﬁre behavior, mopped
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up instead of managing his Crew and resources [1, 33]. On the YH Fire, the GMHS, cut
off by the main ﬁre as they attempted to relocate to the BSR, mistakenly referred to
themselves on the Air-to-Ground (A/G) channel as “Granite Mountain 7” [10]. There is
no Granite Mountain 7, only a former PFD “Crew 7” Fuels Crew. Stress can impair
understanding situational complexity and the ability to logically strategize. Grossman
and others offer workable solutions: frequent, quasi-military drills extensively for
“stress acclimatization”, “stress inoculation”, to “push the envelope … repeated over
time” [22, 34].
5 Organizational Culture and Influences
5.1 Municipal FD and PFD Attitude and Influence
The PFD WBC truly considered the GMHS his sons. He defended the GMHS fatal (in)
actions as well as the PFD (in)actions in a July 2013 News Conference at the YH Fire
Fatality Site. The WBC held structure protection as a higher priority over WF safety,
“… no WF is satisﬁed stuck sitting in a SZ while structures were being threatened” [1,
26]. These are strong indicators of the conflicting values of many Municipal FDs that
also ﬁght wildﬁres. Confusion, frustration, and doubt, known hazardous barriers, may
support potential human failures on wildﬁres when structures are threatened. GMHS
McDonough’s actions are a prime example of the above cultural influences on
municipal/wildland FDs and WFs. During the investigation he was asked if the GMHS
knew of and followed the “10 & 18”. Probably coached, he stated, “We had issues with
#10, (Fight ﬁre aggressively having provided for safety ﬁrst), it’s old, that’s hillbilly …
we’re a lot smarter than that”. Third year WFs would not likely conclude that on their
own [17, 26] So it is quite telling that this influential, spoken PFD municipal/wildland
ﬁre “policy” attitude, even though unwritten, was at least acceptably regarded and
obeyed by a third year WF. And it would also be a permissible inference that other
GMHS accepted and regarded this PFD “policy” attitude as well [22].
5.2 Critical Examination of the SAIT and SAIR
High Reliability Organizations (HRO) (e.g., aircraft carrier, nuclear power plant, and
wildland ﬁre operations, are preoccupied with all failures, even small ones. Trivial
errors discovered early are warning signals of deepening trouble, insight into the health
of the entire system. Problems found early allow more possible ways to deal with them.
However, non-HRO members tend to overlook their failures, suggesting incompetence,
and focus instead on successes, conveying competence. [35]. For many WFs, this is
theoretical guidance, and not realistic, evidenced by the repeated fatalities for the same
fatal causes - poor decisions based on several physiological and psychological factors
ignored by almost all SAITs discussed in this paper.
In fact, in 1996 on the Hochderffer Hills Fire Shelter Deployment Investigation, the
Human Factors Specialist brieﬁng began with: “The ﬁrst thing we are going to do is
establish a conclusion, then ﬁnd the facts to ﬁt that conclusion.” The primary author
was the Operations Specialist [26] and directly participated in this brieﬁng. The authors
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contend the YH Fire SAIT followed the same format of establishing the conclusion ﬁrst
by ﬁnding, “… no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or
protocol” [1, 10]. Afﬁrmatively, their conclusion implies the GMHS safely accom-
plished their tasks, yet a disaster beyond belief occurred. It is impossible that every-
thing was performed correctly on a wildﬁre if 19 men burned to death. The SAIT’s
approving conclusion reflects Orwellian Doublespeak and worse, Doublethink,
simultaneously holding two contradictory beliefs as true [29]. The authors and others
argue, this ongoing truth manipulation occurs with all wildﬁre SAIT, SAIR, and other
versions of Incident Analyses, Guidance, and Review where WFs are killed by ﬁre
[1, 11, 26].
Consider now the comparison of the idealized image, a fabricated ‘conclusion ﬁrst’,
with an actual photo that reveals the truth of what factually occurred. Figure 1 below
(left image) is the SAIT/SAIR Fig. 18 [10], sham idealized image of the alleged ﬁre
split, trapping the GMHS. The SAIR correctly noted the thunderstorm out-flow
boundary moved from north to south between 1618 to 1630 MST. The ﬁre was
“immediate and impressive” and when the ﬁre spread direction changed 180 degrees,
intensiﬁed when flame lengths doubled while the rates of spread tripled and “prob-
lematic ﬁre behavior became extreme” [10]. The authors believe the idealized image
falsely alleges, “… the ﬁre entered the middle bowl and moved southwest.” The Fig. 1
right photo clearly reveals otherwise. Figure 1’s left idealized image shows ﬁre running
across the middle bowl, headed for the box canyon behind the “Granite Knoll”. In
contrast, in the right photo, left of the smoke column and the advancing ﬁre, the
backdrop ‘hazy’ mountain ridge is likely the southern route the GMHS took to reach
the saddle and then drop into the box canyon, 540 s (less than 9 min) before the
Acting GMHS Supt. ﬁrst called “Mayday” on A/G. The right photo reveals no evidence
that a line of ﬁre was simultaneously ‘crawling up’ the back ridge toward the saddle,
Fig. 1. Left - SAIR Fig. 18 idealized image created by the SAIT [10]. Right - ‘iPhone 4’ photo
taken by AZ Forestry Brian Lauber at 1629 on 6/30/13 near the Yarnell Ranch House restaurant
looking west [36]. This photo was provided to Brad Mayhew, SAIT Human Factors Investigator,
however, it was not included in the SAIR.
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refuting the SAIT ‘theory’ that the GMHS saw ﬁre “ahead of them” and “behind them”
at 4:39 PM, when the ﬁrst “Mayday” went out [10, 36]. The authors claim that the
SAIT intentionally deceives with this half-truth, “… the middle bowl, … funneled the
ﬁre at a rapid rate of spread toward the top of the ridge” [10]. The photo noticeably
contradicts that claim.
6 Conclusion and Recommendations
Dorner states: “Our minds have extreme trouble tackling problems that cannot be
visualized [24]. Speciﬁc concepts for improved wildﬁre safety and investigations were
presented, derived from a long-established and recognized fatality-prone profession.
These proposals applied to well-established and dependable ongoing leadership, human
factors, and wildﬁre training, can signiﬁcantly contribute to validated safety measures
to reduce wildﬁre fatalities. Groupthink and mitigation measures are examined. Bur-
nette et al. found that common goal pursuit under authoritative leadership in a
provocative situation can lead groups to take excessive risks. Further research is vital to
understand group decision-making, so that WF leaders at all levels, but especially those
on the ﬁrelines, may recognize and then terminate Groupthink’s toxic effects to avert
disasters.
The GMHS leaders most directly responsible for Crew actions faced a series of
decisions during their ill-fated time on the YH Fire, and their poor decisions brought
them to disaster’s threshold. Useem et al. state: “The human consequences of subop-
timal decisions by ﬁre leaders are compellingly clear, and, conversely, optimal lead-
ership decisions are … vital for successfully suppressing a ﬁre” [18] and managing
WFs. The authors present nine recommendations below to guide WFs to make good,
sound, and safe decisions to realize those optimal goals and make history by lessening
fatalities.
1. Ensure leadership goals and duties are the safety and welfare of those you supervise;
2. Train beyond sufﬁciency. Train to warrior status with “stress inoculation”;
3. Maintain operational Leadership and Group Dynamics training for all WF’s;
4. Reduce Groupthink risks with Leader’s Intent, then allow the Group to decide;
5. Hire able, qualiﬁed females in supervisory positions to ease Groupthink potential;
6. Censure freelancing - unilaterally committing to tasks minus supervisory consent;
7. Give positive advice and focus, (i.e. tell people what to do instead of what not to
do);
8. Demand WF’s learn and apply the wildland ﬁreﬁghting rules on every wildﬁre; and
9. Require absolute honest answers in SAITs and Reviews with fact-led conclusions.
Prior to applying these wildland ﬁreﬁghting insights into practice, cogent, open,
ongoing, respectful, and organized empirical research is needed. In spite of the intractable
controversial and emotional attitudes and behaviors of many WFs and GMHS family,
friends, and loved ones that oppose revealing the YH Fire truths, the authors hope this
paper encourages further YH Fire disaster assessments and revelations to better ascertain
the many veiled facts and analyses, thus permitting valuable lessons learned.
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